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Latin AmericaHaving launched its ﬁrst ofﬁce in Panama in 1984, FUNDES had
become a major player in the ﬁeld of economic development work in
Latin America. As of 2011, the organization had ofﬁces in ten countries
of the region. FUNDES is an example of a nonproﬁt organization that
effectively operateswithin the uncertain conditions of emerging econo-
mies. In light of institutional voids, large informal markets, vast and
often still underexplored social needs, unpredictable environmental
conditions and a volatile macroeconomic environment (Godfrey,
2011; Vassolo, Castro, & Gomez-Mejia, 2011), these organizations are
particularly prone to confronting unexpected events. As shown by the
recent discussion on “emerging giants” (Khanna & Palepu, 2006) such
as Masisa in Chile or Cemex in Mexico, there are an increasing number
of enterprises from emerging countries that are successfully competing
against international corporations, both within their home country and
abroad, despite these challenging conditions. Surprisingly, many do not
work with state-of-the-art strategy tools and techniques, but rather
focus on short-term decisions and less formal strategy processes
(Brenes, Mena, & Molina, 2007; Ogliastri et al., 1999).
These and other examples suggest that there is much to learn from
Latin American ﬁrms (Jäger & Sathe, 2014). The present case studyr), urs.jager@incae.edu
. This is an open access article underadopts this promising perspective, and explores how one nonproﬁt or-
ganization, FUNDES, successfully managed its operations under ﬂuctu-
ating conditions. It traces important stages of the organization's
development, which enabled it to continue to fulﬁll its mission to
promote the competitive development of MSMEs in Latin America for
30 years. More particularly, the case draws attention to how FUNDES
managed strategic change by employing principles of “collective
mindfulness.”1. Mindfulness and strategy
The original notion of mindfulness refers to an individual's state of
mind, characterized by heightened awareness and sensitivity to its con-
text. Weick and colleagues were pioneers in raising the level of analysis
to collectives, studyingmindfulness of groups and organizations (for the
theoretical grounding see Weick, 1979; Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld,
1999). Their seminal studies focused on high reliability organizations
(HROs) such as aircraft carriers, emergency medical services and air
trafﬁc control centers (e.g.Weick, 1990).More than other organizations,
HROs strive to produce reliable outcomes in the face of volatile environ-
ments and unpredictable events, because failure to do so could have po-
tentially catastrophic consequences. Based on these studies, scholars
developed the notion of “collectivemindfulness” to describe “the capac-
ity of groups and individuals to be acutely aware of signiﬁcant details, to
notice errors in the making, and to have the shared expertise and free-
dom to act on what they notice” (Weick, Sutcliffe, & Obstfeld, 2000:the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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conditions; they are able to act in light of unexpected events and use
them as opportunities for reﬂection and learning (Weick & Putnam,
2006; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).
Collective mindfulness is expressed in ﬁve principles (Weick et al.,
1999, 2000): Mindful organizations pay attention to potential sources
of errors and see small deviations as occasions to adapt or improve
their operations (preoccupation with failure). They demonstrate a
healthy skepticism regarding their own accomplishments, and regard-
ing simpliﬁed assumptions and explanations, ensuring that they do
not overlook information that may be important for decision-making
(reluctance to simplify). They also maintain a heightened awareness of
current operations so that they can take immediate corrective action
as necessary (sensitivity to operations). These three principles allow or-
ganizations to anticipate failure or correct still minor deviations from a
reliable course of action. Once an unanticipated problem occurs, mind-
ful organizations are able to contain the issue at an early stage before
it can cause noteworthy damage. They do this based on two additional
principles of collective mindfulness: Mindful organizations develop
the capacity to bounce back, which may manifest in several different
ways — from routines that allow for a rapid response to the capacity
to improvise (commitment to resilience); and they demonstrate ﬂuid
decision-making structures so that decisions and actions can be made
by the most knowledgeable individuals and groups, independent of
their position in the organizational hierarchy (deference to expertise).
Taken together, collective mindfulness is based on “attention direct-
ed both outward and inward, and preoccupation with here and now”
(Weick & Putnam, 2006: 276). Mindful organizations pay attention to
their internal operations, while also fostering a differentiated apprecia-
tion of what characterizes their context, and different ways to approach
it. Mindfulness develops over time. Managers can cultivate its develop-
ment throughmechanisms that foster diversity on the one hand, for in-
stance, by recruiting employees with different backgrounds and
experiences (Weick et al., 2000; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007), and integrate
diversity on the other hand, for instance, through systems andprocesses
that allow everyone in the organization to understandhow their diverse
actions and perspectives connect back to the “big picture” (Roberts &
Bea, 2001).
Through seminal studies on HROs, collective mindfulness has re-
ceived signiﬁcant attention on the operational level, within the context
of organizations whose primary goal consists in performance reliability
(Roberts, 1990). However, the need to deal with volatile environments
and unpredictable events is also a concern for organizations in a more
general sense (Roberts & Bea, 2001), and it often affects them on a stra-
tegic level (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).
FUNDES is an interesting case to study organizational mindfulness
on a strategic level within the context of a nonproﬁt organization. For
nonproﬁts such as FUNDES, managing organizational activities is not
so much geared towards reliable, error-free operations, as with typical
high reliability organization (Roberts, 1990), or competitive advantage,
as with classic business organizations, as it is towards the fulﬁllment of
the organization's social mission (Austin, Gutiérrez, Ogliastri, & Reﬁcco,
2006; Dolnicar, Irvine, & Lazarevski, 2008). Mindful nonproﬁts employ
principles and practices that protect the fulﬁllment of their mission in
the face of the unexpected. These practices are strategic, in the sense
that they secure the organization's access to ﬁnancial and other re-
sources, such as sufﬁcient funding and a mission-oriented workforce
(Young, Wilsker, & Grinsfelder, 2010).
The FUNDES case illustrates how managers and employees
employed practices of collective mindfulness to confront issues of stra-
tegic importance at three critical points in time, and how this enabled
them to secure the fulﬁllment of the organization's mission and its
long-term survival. The case extends the application of the concept of
mindfulness beyond the operational level of HROs, and beyond compet-
itive businesses, to the strategic level of nonproﬁt organizations, and
contributes to the understanding of effective strategic practices ofﬁrms operating in Latin America (Brenes, 2000; Brenes et al., 2007;
Ogliastri et al., 1999).
2. Roles and challenges of MSMEs in Latin America
2.1. The role of MSMEs in the socio-economic development of Latin America
Latin America, the Spanish and Portuguese speaking sub-region of
the American continent, includes twenty sovereign states, with a total
population of 600 million. Although today the region beneﬁts from rel-
atively well-developed infrastructures and largely democratized
governments—both major preconditions for stable societies and func-
tioning economies (Booth, Wade & Walker, 2009)—poverty remains a
signiﬁcant challenge, and Latin America is still the region with the
highest income inequality in the world (Ortiz & Cummins, 2011).
The private sector, particularly its more than 18million micro, small
and medium sized enterprises (MSMEs), plays a crucial role in the so-
cioeconomic development of Latin America. MSMEs create jobs, reduce
poverty and contribute to the social development of the region. In 2010,
99% of Latin American ﬁrms belonged to this group, including enter-
prises with less than ten employees (one-person businesses and family
microbusinesses), enterprises with 10 to 50 employees (small
businesses), and those with 50 to 150 employees (medium-sized
businesses). They were contributing up to 50% of the GDP of Latin
American countries; and creating more than 60% of the jobs available
in the region, with the portion of job-creation through microbusinesses
ranging from 51% in Colombia to 98% in Honduras (Henríquez, 2010).
MSMEs in Latin America have a number of characteristics in
common, though they differ from country to country in their particular
impact and dynamics. First, in 2008, more than 70% of MSMEs, particu-
larlymicro and small businesses operated in the economy's least produc-
tive sectors, such as agriculture or retail, 20% in industry and transport,
and around 8% in sectors with high-productivity such as energy or ﬁ-
nance (Latemeconomy, 2013). There is also a low level of international-
ization, with most MSMEs producing for the domestic market. In 2009,
just 5% were exporting their goods (FUNDES, 2009). Finally, the region
is characterized by a large informal sector; many MSMEs are not regis-
tered and, thus, operate outside of their country's legal framework,
such as labor, ﬁscal and environmental legislation (Godfrey, 2011). In
2006, informality was an average of 60%, with Bolivia, Peru and
Guatemala at a particularly high rate of more than 70% (WorldBank,
2007). By comparison, just 21% of businesses in Europe were operating
in the informal sector in the same year.
2.2. Challenges for MSMEs in doing business
In light of the abovementioned characteristics, as well as the busi-
ness environment of emerging markets, MSMEs face a number of chal-
lenges. For decades, knowledge of these challenges remained limited
due to the high level of informality, which largely excludes businesses
from being statistically registered, and due to still poorly developed na-
tional institutions and infrastructures for the collection and analysis of
relevant data. Although country-speciﬁc information on particular as-
pects such as export often still remains limited (Latemeconomy,
2013), the growing awareness of the importance of MSMEs to the
region's socio-economic development (see below) has led more and
more international organizations to systematically study the region
and inform the interested public on a regular basis.
Increasing knowledge regarding MSMEs in Latin America shows
that, in contrast to entrepreneurs in developed countries, individuals
whowish to start, sustain or grow their businesses in emergingmarkets
face particularly difﬁcult conditions. Given their limited access to inter-
national markets, they heavily rely on national and local markets with
often highly volatile economic cycles. At the same time, due to a lack
of competitiveness regarding the volume, quality and price of their
goods, MSMEs have poor connections to large ﬁrm supply chains.
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a variety of ways (Latemeconomy, 2013). In its 2009 Doing Business
report on 181 countries, the World Bank found that, in Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries,
it took entrepreneurs an average of 13.6 days to start a new business,
while their counterparts in Chile needed to invest 27 days, and
60 days in Costa Rica. Firing costs in OECD countries were 25.8 weeks
of salary (including notice period and severance payments),
compared to 52 weeks in Peru and 135 in Ecuador (WorldBank, 2009)
(see Fig. 1).
An additional limitation for MSMEs is the capacity of their work-
force. More than 36% of companies operating in the formal sector in
Latin America face challenges in ﬁnding properly trained workers,
compared with 15% in OECD countries. Because many MSMEs provide
an alternative to unemployment and fulﬁll a need for subsistence, the
majority of MSME managers and employees have never received busi-
ness training or consulting services for their enterprises. Finally,
MSMEs bear the burden of operating in the informal sector. They face
limitations in their capacity for growth, including limited access to
capital, and challenges in providing beneﬁts for their workers, which
in turn often contributes to disloyalty among the workforce. The global
economic crisis of 2008 further worsened the situation, reducing thePart A
Starting a business
Procedures 
(number)
Time
(days)
Costs         
(% of income
per capita)
D
h
OECD 5,8 13,4 4,9
LATIN AMERICA
Argentina 15 32 9
Brazil 18 152 8,2
Chile 9 27 7,5
Colombia 9 36 14,1
Costa Rica 12 60 20,5
Ecuador 14 65 38,5
Mexico 9 28 12,5
Peru 10 65 25,7
Uruguay 11 44 43,5
Part B
Paying  taxes
Payments 
(number 
per year)
Profit tax 
(%)
Income tax 
and dues 
(%)
Total tax 
rate
(% of profit)
OECD 13,4 17,4 24,4 45,3
LATIN AMERICA
Argentina 9 2,8 29,4 n.d.
Brazil 11 21,3 40,6 69,4
Chile 10 18,3 3,8 25,9
Colombia 31 17,9 33,4 78,4
Costa 
Rica 43 19,8 29,3 55,7
Ecuador 8 18,5 13,7 34,9
Mexico 27 23,2 27,0 51,5
Peru 9 27,1 11,8 41,2
Uruguay 53 23,2 10,5 58,5
Fig. 1. Indicators related to regulations of the business environment in Latinoverall demand for goods and services and increasing delays in pay-
ments from clients, and adding to the difﬁculties faced by businesses
in obtaining credit from ﬁnancial institutions. As a result of these
various limitations, by 2010, only 45% of Latin American MSMEs were
surviving their ﬁrst three years of operation (Henríquez, 2010).
For organizations such as FUNDES that aim to address the
needs of MSMEs and promote their competitive development, these
conditions—which represent a diverse and frequently changing set of
signiﬁcant challenges to doing business, coupled with an often limited
availability of speciﬁc socioeconomic data on MSMEs and their needs,
and a volatile macroeconomic environment—have long made Latin
America a challenging context to operate, particularly when serving
several countries throughout the region.
3. Addressing the needs ofMSMEs: the business development service
sector
The early 1980smarked the beginning of an increasing awareness, in
Latin America and other parts of theworld, that promoting the develop-
ment of MSMEs is a powerful strategy for poverty alleviation. In a
conference organized by the OECD in 1989, experts discussed the prin-
ciples of economic development work, as well as several internationalEmploying workers
         ifficulty of 
iring index
(1-100)
Rigidity of 
hours
index 
(1-100)
Difficulty of 
firing index 
(1-100)
Firing costs 
(weeks of 
salary; incl. 
notice period 
& severance 
payments )
25,7 42,2 26,3 25,8
44 60 0 95
78 60 0 37
33 20 20 52
11 40 20 59
44 40 0 35
44 60 50 135
33 40 70 52
44 40 60 52
33 60 0 31
Closing a business Construction 
permits
Time 
(years) 
Costs                 
(% of 
estate)
Recovery 
rate (cents 
on the  
dolar)
Proce-
dures 
(number)
Time (days)
1,7 8,4 68,6 15,4 162
2,8 12 29,8 28 338
4,0 12 17,1 18 411
4,5 15 21,3 18 155
3,0 1 52,8 13 114
3,5 15 25,4 23 191
5,3 18 16,1 19 155
1,8 18 64,2 12 138
3,1 7 25,4 21 210
2,1 7 43,0 30 234
America. Source: World Bank (2009) and Henríquez (2010), p. 53–54.
3 The Fundación AVINA promotes the sustainable development of Latin America by
supporting partnerships between social leaders, companies, governmental institutions
and academia. It operates in 21 countries in the region. Also see http://www.avina.net.
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initiatives have emerged or gainedmomentumsupporting the develop-
ment of MSMEs through the provision of business development
services (BDS).
Business development services include ﬁnancial services, such as the
provision of microcredits, credit guarantees, credits and capital, and a
diverse set of non-ﬁnancial services that include training, consulting
and advisory services, marketing assistance, access to information, or
technology transfer among MSMEs to help entrepreneurs start, sustain
or grow their business (Edgcomb&Girardo, 2012). BDS aims to increase
MSMEmarket access, reduceproductivity gaps between these organiza-
tions and large ﬁrms, formalize MSME businesses, establish adequate
working conditions, and create more dynamic business environments.
Important providers of business development services include indi-
viduals, private for-proﬁt companies, non-governmental and nonproﬁt
organizations, state-owned enterprises, and industry associations.
They differ in the type and range of services they offer, and often partner
with others in developing and/or delivering their services. An increasing
number of providers, coupled with a more challenging macroeconomic
environment since the global economic crisis of 2008, have increased
competition for funding and resources between BDS providers. With
this, comes the need for service providers to differentiate themselves
from their “rivals.”Meanwhile, investors put more and more attention
on assessing the impact of their investments. This ﬁnds expression, for
example, in the Donor Committee for Enterprise Development, a
forum in which large donors discuss the best investment practices and
standards for measuring results.
Funding for BDS providers comes from three main sources: public
funding through governments or local municipalities, private capital
from philanthropy, or earned revenue generated by the service pro-
viders themselves. Microﬁnance organizations generate revenue in the
form of interests and fees. Further, BDS providers may be organized as
social businesses (Yunus, Moingeon, & Lehmann-Ortega, 2010), which
follow a more revenue-based sustainability strategy and sell services
to cover their costs. The number of service providers organized as social
businesses is still small, however, and the portion of their earned reve-
nue usually amounts to less than half of their funding. Which types of
funding sources BDS providers can most easily access depends on a
number of factors, such as whether or not the provider follows a social
mission andmeets the often speciﬁc investment interests of philanthro-
pists, or can contribute to the development goals of national or local
governments.
More recently, the partnering of large enterprises with BDS pro-
viders has gained momentum, but its importance is still limited. A
study of Dalberg, a global development advisor, found that this is due
to “[t]he lack of familiarity between the sectors” and “the challenges
faced by NGOs in ﬁguring out how to partner with businesses without
compromising the integrity of their mission” (Dalberg, 2007: 4 f.). Also,
when companies were asked what was the most important reason for
them to partnerwith social actors, receiving support in implementing ef-
fective corporate social responsibility programs was the most common
answer, while “[a]dvancing core business objectives”was the least.
Still, one type of BDS with increasing traction for large companies
and popularity among BDS providers in 2010, was to support the inclu-
sion of MSMEs in the value chains of large enterprises, thereby better
connectingMSMEs to national and internationalmarkets. This approach
could be observed globally in the work of a number of companies, such
as Nespresso. Near the turn of the millennium, Nespresso recognized
that its future successwas intimately tied to the success of the small cof-
fee farmers from whom it purchased. The company's need for a consis-
tent supply of top quality Arabica beans meant that it would need to
ﬁnd a way to support the development of its suppliers. Through a
sustainability program, launched in partnership with the Rainforest
Alliance and the World Bank Group's International Finance Firm,
Nespresso sought to secure Real Farmer Income™ by signiﬁcantly en-
hancing the quality, sustainability and productivity of coffee suppliersin Latin America. The partnership developed the community-based pro-
duction infrastructure, provided farmers with ﬁnancial training, and
sponsored productivity-enhancing research at leading institutions.
This impacted more than 50,000 small farmers in ﬁve countries across
Latin America (Whittingham, 2014).
4. FUNDES
When it established pilot operations in Panama in 1984, FUNDES
was one of the ﬁrst private organizations to focus on economic develop-
ment work in Latin America. At that time, its service consisted of the
provision of credit guarantees. In the decades that followed, FUNDES
would partner with governments, large corporations, international or-
ganizations and private foundations to develop and deliver a broad
portfolio of services in line with its social mission to promote the
competitive development of micro, small and medium-sized ﬁrms
(MSMEs) in Latin America. More than 14 institutions, including the
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC) and the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF)
supported projects through expertise, access to and provision of ﬁnan-
cial and other resources and connections to further cooperation part-
ners. By 2000, FUNDES was running ofﬁces in 10 Latin American
countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela), organized as franchises.
Costa Rica became the site of its central ofﬁce, FUNDES International.
The organization did more than just increase its geographic reach
over the years. In response to the shifting needs of its beneﬁciaries
and a volatile market, it also changed and broadened the type of BDS
it provided. In 2009, the nonproﬁt's BDS included four types of services,
addressing everything from the individual enterprise to the overall
business environment: (1) Development at business level: support for
MSMEs by improving their performance, helping in the acquisition of
international certiﬁcations or planning new initiatives; (2) Value chain
development: the establishment of strategic, long-term relationships
between MSMEs—often ﬁrst grouped together to form a larger and
better-structured business entity (cluster)—and large ﬁrms to the ben-
eﬁt of both parties; (3) Sectorial/territorial development: the design
and implementation of interventions that transform whole business
sectors and guaranteed jobs in the long term; and (4) Improvement of
the business environment: reducing public sector obstacles to initiating,
operating, developing and closing businesses. In more than 80 projects
carried out in seven countries, FUNDES helped increase the number of
legalized (formalized) businesses by 30%, and reduced the number of
procedures necessary to start a business by 52%. In 2008, the Business
Guide to Partnering with NGOs and the United Nations recognized
FUNDES as one of the top 85 nonproﬁt organizations out of 554 NGOs/
UN agencies, rated based on its work with the business sector.
In 2009, FUNDES was confronted with the aftermath of the global
economic crisis and the announcement that its main donor, Fundación
AVINA (AVINA Foundation),3 was to cease funding. FUNDES had two
years to adapt to these unforeseeable events and secure its long-term
survival. In 2011, FUNDES ofﬁcially announced a change that was even
more fundamental than the modiﬁcations to its service portfolio. In a
press release, the nonproﬁt explained that, with the help of a new busi-
ness model, it would now focus its efforts on “develop[ing] projects to
strengthen MSMEs through their integration in the value chain of
large companies” (FUNDES, 2011). From 2009 to 2011, it more than
doubled the share of its income generated through projects with large
enterprises and governments from 42 to 87%. By this time, it had sup-
ported the development of almost 300,000 MSMEs in Latin America.
Howwas FUNDES able to continue to fulﬁll its mission in the face of
the ever-changing needs of its beneﬁciaries and one of the most severe
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nonproﬁt employed principles of collective mindfulness to repeatedly
adapt its service portfolio and to master a fundamental change to its
business model—practices that became particularly prevalent when
FUNDES needed to transition between important stages of its
development.
5. FUNDES' main stages in promoting the development of MSMEs
5.1. Stage I: using donations to provide credit guarantees (1984–1996)
In 1984, a Swiss businessman and philanthropist Stephan
Schmidheiny, and the then Archbishop of Panama created the nonproﬁt
organization FUNDES – “Fundación por un Desarrollo Sostenible”
(Foundation for Sustainable Development) – in response to the region's
high poverty rate. FUNDES considered small businesses to be key to
Latin America's development but the difﬁculty of obtaining access to
formal credit signiﬁcantly impeded their growth and success. FUNDES's
ﬁrst strategy to fulﬁll its mission to promote the competitive develop-
ment of MSMEs in Latin America was to help them access capital
through a then innovative concept. The nonproﬁt motivated banks to
lend money to MSMEs by giving them credit guarantees of up to 25%
of the capital provided. Though, in actuality, it was the banks that lent
the money and assumed the direct risks, FUNDES soon became known
as the “bank of small enterprises” (FUNDES, 2005).
In 1987, the Swiss Ernst A. Brugger became FUNDES's ﬁrst CEO. The
organization had grown rapidly, with 160 employees by the start of the
1990s. Until 1994, Stephan Schmidheiny was FUNDES's primary donor.
He then created the ﬁnancial trust, Fundación AVINA, as part of his phil-
anthropic network. The foundation would replace his investments,
funding nearly 100% of the nonproﬁt's budget in the years that followed.
The long-term intention, however, was to help FUNDES to become
ﬁnancially independent.
5.2. Stage II: acquiring ﬁnancial resources for training and business envi-
ronment development programs (1996–2002)
By 1996, FUNDES had ofﬁces in nine Latin American countries (a
tenth ofﬁce opened in El Salvador in 2000). The organization appeared
to be delivering its services effectively, therewere nonoteworthy “com-
petitors” on the horizon, and, as one FUNDES manager described the ﬁ-
nancial situation of that time:
Resources were not a problem.We had no need to generate income;
the central ofﬁce paid the salaries. We just needed to fulﬁll the mis-
sion.
Although FUNDES seemed to be in a comfortable and safe position,
and although it had established signiﬁcant expertise, programs and
structures to serve as a credit guarantee provider, the organization
still displayed a preoccupation with failure (Weick et al., 1999). Its man-
agement and employees were vigilant in tracking the impact of its ser-
vices on MSMEs and thus the fulﬁllment of FUNDES's mission During
the organization's ﬁrst stage of development, Brugger had already
begun small-scale pilots of two new types of services in some of the
countries FUNDES served: training for MSME employees and programs
that aimed to transform the business environment into one that facili-
tated the start-up, operation and growth of businesses.
To better understand themarket, and to verify whether or not there
was indeed a need to expand these new types of services, FUNDES's
management team commissioned a research study in 1996. Monitoring
operations and service delivery engages an organization in the process
of scrutinizing why it does what it does and, thus, can contribute to
learning and collective mindfulness (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). The re-
sults of the study conﬁrmed that enabling access to microcredits,
FUNDES's main service at that time, was not sufﬁcient to promote thedevelopment of MSMEs. Entrepreneurs and SME managers were often
unprepared to handle the money that was granted effectively, and the
lack of adequate institutional structures still made it difﬁcult for them
to grow their businesses.
After 1996, FUNDES implemented the ﬁrst fundamental change to
its service portfolio. While continuing to provide the original service of
facilitating access to capital, the nonproﬁt further developed its concept
of “SME schools,” which were ﬁrst launched in Costa Rica, Mexico and
Chile, and then spread to other countries in the region. The schools pro-
vided training in basic management functions such as ﬁnance, market-
ing, sales, retail and human resources, and ran from a few hours to
several weeks. In 1995, 1590 people participated in the programs. By
1999, the number of participants had reached 27,000 (Grass, 2000). In
addition, departing from a pilot project in Colombia, FUNDES launched
a Business Environment Development program that aimed to create fa-
vorable conditions and/or institutions that were important to running a
business, but were widely unavailable (institutional voids)—for exam-
ple, microcredit banks that could provide MSMEs with much needed
ﬁnancial resources.
In 1996, HansW. Grass became FUNDES's second CEO.With the new
leadership, and coupled with the changes to its service portfolio, the or-
ganization began to realign its structures and processes. In 1998, the
organization's management team created FUNDES International in San
José, Costa Rica, which would serve as the new umbrella organization
for the country ofﬁces. To leverage its resources, FUNDES began to
build up strategic alliances with large local businesses (at the country
level), and with academic and international institutions such as INCAE
Business School in Costa Rica (at the central ofﬁce level). The country of-
ﬁces were organized as franchises—autonomous units that paid a regu-
lar fee to FUNDES International in exchange for offering their services
under the FUNDES brand. FUNDES International, in turn, supported
the country ofﬁces' activities by generating and partly ﬁnancing the pro-
jects then implemented under their lead. The head ofﬁce also absorbed
the countries ofﬁces' expenses for management, product development,
administration and auditing. In turn, the country ofﬁces paid for a
portion of the services that the head ofﬁce provided.5.3. Stage III: acquiring ﬁnancial resources for coaching and consulting
(2002–2009)
Although it had focused on business development programs and
training for a few years, FUNDES managers and employees continued
to practice an important principle of collective mindfulness. They
remained preoccupied with failure (Weick et al., 1999) and diligently
tracked impact of FUNDES's services on MSMEs. And they began to no-
tice an important detail: once participants left FUNDES' training pro-
grams, FUNDES had no knowledge of whether or not these MSME
managers and employees could actually put into practice what they
had learned.
It was time to build on this healthy skepticism and more systemati-
cally verify if there was something FUNDES needed to change. In the
course of 2004, FUNDES sought its participation in an impact evaluation
study of its training and business environment services, carried out by
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC):
Through the study, we learned that MSMEs were facing concrete
problems that needed speciﬁc solutions. The lessons learned during
training needed to be put into MSMEs' business practices, recalled
René Bronsil, who succeeded Hans W. Grass as CEO in 2000. In the
organization's third stage of development, it was clear to the new
CEO that “FUNDES needs to train the people. But it also needs to
structure and stabilize their businesses through consulting.”
In the sense of practicing deference to expertise (Weick et al., 1999),
FUNDES International strived to take the particularities of the individual
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than pursue a “one-sizeﬁts all” strategywhen taking this newdirection.
The organization's central ofﬁce expected country managers to set their
own objectives in response to the speciﬁc demands of local MSMEs.
Meanwhile, the organization's consulting products and decentralized
structure of FUNDES would enable them to effectively achieve these
goals.
In addition to restructuring its service portfolio, Bronsil knew that
FUNDES also needed to seek possibilities to strengthen its ﬁnancial in-
dependence from Fundación AVINA, which was about to further reduce
its funding. Bronsil chose two paths to achieve this: First, to strengthen
FUNDES's fundraising activities and intensify its cooperationwith inter-
national donors such as international nongovernmental organizations.
Second, to explore a new funding model and more vigorously include
private sector players as solvent FUNDES customers.
One such project was with COPROCA in Bolivia. At the time,
COPROCAwas the country's leading company for storing and exporting
llama and alpaca yarn. The ﬁrmworkedwith some 500 suppliers – fam-
ilies of alpaca and llama breeders –who lived in the Bolivian highlands.
The poor quality of life of these breederswas evident in their unsustain-
able rural developments, signiﬁcant losses of cattle, agricultural produc-
tion that was restricted to self-consumption, unbalanced diets and little
motivation towards their work. As a consequence, COPROCA lacked the
quality and quantity of llama and alpaca wool that it needed, and even-
tually reached out to FUNDES for support. From 2005 to 2006, FUNDES
helped the ﬁrm exploit synergies betweenwool suppliers and strength-
en its supply chain. These changes reduced logistic and transaction costs
for the small producers and shortened delivery time. Quality improved,
production increased from three to eight tons per month, and solid
waste was reduced by 66% (FUNDES, 2009).
By 2008, FUNDES has been partneredwith 50 large ﬁrms in business
development projects that aimed to support cooperation between large
ﬁrms, and a total of 3000 MSMEs. At this time, contribution from
Fundación AVINA had more than halved, dropping from more than
USD 8 million in 2001 to USD 3 million from 2005 forward.
5.4. Stage IV: earning revenue and focusing on large enterprises (2008–
2011)
In 2008, Ulrich Frei became FUNDES's fourth executive director.
Coming from a large pharmaceutical company, Ulrich had no experi-
ence in managing a nonproﬁt organization. But he did know the busi-
ness world — a key reason that the FUNDES board hired him. FUNDES
had been a strongly mission-oriented organization. It was important,
however, to remain reluctant to simpliﬁcations (Weick et al., 1999).Table 1
Characteristics of BDS markets in four selected FUNDES countries.
Country Demand Willingness to
Panama Government: high large enterprises: low demand but for
very high quality services oriented towards short-term
results; development agencies: low, because funding
through external cooperation is no principal income source
for the country
Government: h
urgency; large
development a
Costa Rica Government: moderate; large enterprises: result oriented
demand for high quality services; development agencies:
low, because funding through external cooperation is no
principal income source for the country
Moderate in all
the cost–beneﬁt
results
El Salvador Government: moderate, due to limited resources; large
enterprises: focused on high quality training services;
development agencies: high, because country strongly
beneﬁts from funding through external cooperation
Government: v
enterprises: mo
development a
increasing
Guatemala Government: moderate due to budget constraints; large
enterprises: result oriented demand for high quality
services; development agencies: high, because country
strongly beneﬁts from funding through external
cooperation
Government: lo
high, but depen
ration; develop
moderate
Source: based on CLACDS (2010).Bringing in outsiders keeps an organization mindful, as they can intro-
duce alternative views and prevent a tunnel vision (Weick & Sutcliffe,
2007). The board was seeking an executive director who could lead
FUNDES into a future in which the organization would be ﬁnancially
independent from its principal donor, Fundación AVINA, one day.
However, it is likely that no onehad foreseen just how timely this as-
piration would turn out to be. The year 2008 marked the outset of an
economic crisis and a recession that would affect the global economy
in a way not experienced since the Great Depression. FUNDES could
not escape this context, which would soon have severe implications
on its funding. The economic downturn prompted companies to cut
back on professional development expenses, which directly affected
FUNDES's income from the provision of training services. In 2009,
after years of nearly constant growth, FUNDES country ofﬁce revenues
began to decrease (see Fig. 2).
Also, as a consequence of the developments in the global economy,
many foundations and international organizations had reduced their
donations and/or started to focus their attention on regions that were
more impoverished than Latin America. Thiswas also true for Fundación
AVINA. After years of reduced – but constant – funding of 3 million USD
(see Fig. 3), in early 2009, FUNDES's main donor announced that it
would be reducing its funds to zero within the next two years.
This decision was not completely unforeseen, but did come sooner
than most FUNDES managers and employees had anticipated. It also
put Frei and his management team under increased pressure to come
upwith a new funding strategy in already trying times. The organization
was challenged to demonstrate resilience (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007).
FUNDES would need to become ﬁnancially independent within two
years, and ﬁnancially self-sufﬁcient in the long-term. Under the lead of
Rene Bronsil, the organization had generated funds through donations
and earned income. Frei and his team were convinced that the best
course for the future was to consistently strengthen FUNDES's market
orientation, and completely focus on earned income and the sale of pro-
jects to large enterprises. Since his start at FUNDES, however, he had the
feeling of “entering a philanthropic organization.” Six out of the 10 coun-
try managers still felt strongly connected to FUNDES' donation-based
funding model, and were deeply committed to its traditional mission-
oriented approach. They were more likely to support a search for a
new donor than the implementation of a new, market-oriented funding
strategy.
In order to gain a more systematic view of FUNDES' situation and
avoid overhasty decisions, Frei launched several analyses of the
organization's external and internal context (Weick & Putnam, 2006).
The results of an external analysis of the funding market supported
the strategy preferred by FUNDES's management team. First, long-pay Growth & Specialization
igh due to sense of
enterprises: moderate;
gencies: moderate
Panama is in a phase of expansion; strong increase in the
demand for BDS; demand for little specialized BDS; MSMEs:
demand associated with economic growth (e.g. expansion
of the Panama Channel; growth of hotels; metro)
sectors; depending on
ratio and tangible
Costa Rica is in a phase of reconversion towards issues related
to modern technologies and more specialized BDS; MSMEs:
demand has been increasing in proportion to competition and
market access
ery low; large
derate but increasing
gencies: moderate but
Starting from little specialization, the BDS market is in a phase
of transition towards more sophisticated services; MSMEs:
demand is prompted by international aid programs; volume
of these programs has contracted in recent years
w; large enterprises:
ding on cost–beneﬁt
ment agencies:
Starting from little specialization, the BDS market is in a
phase of maturation towards a more specialized demand in
particular by large enterprises; MSMEs: demand is
prompted by international aid programs; volumes of these
programs has contracted in recent years
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Income total 3.192 5.505 4.654 4.897 5.601 6.955 9.242 8.411 8.450 7.145 
Mexico 266 1.238 1.013 990 989 1.312 3.380 2.207 1.775 1.676 
Guatemala 339 118 117 150 223 141 109 232 325 163 
El Salvador 2 704 851 967 1.447 2.177 2.606 1.428 1.415 1.512 
Costa Rica 342 526 543 701 601 571 583 758 718 553 
Panama 112 295 797 561 255 226 185 399 511 322 
Colombia 404 229 239 329 514 679 536 959 554 583 
Venezuela 452 612 300 130 344 238 333 570 737 254 
Bolivia 265 518 84 175 347 501 366 392 763 653 
Chile 891 936 692 785 847 1.049 978 1.098 1.244 1.117 
Argentina 120 329 17 108 34 60 166 367 408 312 
Fig. 2. Revenue by country over the time (in 1000 USD). Source: Financial report FUNDES International.
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expected to either exit or reduce their co-investments in the coming
years, as a result of the ﬁnancial crisis. Second, continuing a largely
donation-based funding strategy, as FUNDES had done in the past,
would likely prove risky in the future; donor capital was limited, so
FUNDES, as a still growing organization, would need to secure multiple
new donors. The analyses also showed that donors were changing their
missions and strategies more frequently than in the past — and even if
there mission remained the same, many donors would likely support
FUNDES' mission-orientation, but would be more skeptical when it
came to also working to beneﬁt large enterprises. Finally, governments
were attractive clients, but only in some of the countries in which
FUNDES operated (again see Table 1).
FUNDES also displayed a preoccupation with failure in regard to its
position concerning competitors. Management was aware that the or-
ganization needed to become more vigilant regarding “competitors” in
the funding market. Another external analysis showed that FUNDES
could still differentiate itself from other BDS providers, particularly hav-
ing 25 years of experience in supportingMSMEs, a presence in 10 coun-
tries, its own research activities, proprietary tools and methodologies,
and a strong implementation capacity. Experts predicted, however,
that the number of BDS providers was rising and with it the number
of competitors.Members of the Aspen Network for Development Entre-
preneurs (ANDE)4 were particularly likely to embark on strategies that
followed the same development path and service portfolio as FUNDES.
In addition, a market study in 2010 (CLACDS, 2010) identiﬁed more
than 40 potential competitors in the provision of services similar to
those provided by FUNDES in four key countries that the organization
served (see Table 2).
Frei felt that these results largely conﬁrmed his strategic intent to
orient the organization towards markets. Large companies would play
a crucial role in two ways: First, as a source of funding for projects,
and second, as a way to deliver services that would help FUNDES differ-
entiate itself more strongly from its competitors.
But Frei also needed to consider the results of the organization's in-
ternal analysis, which depicted it as organization in “stress” and “fear,”
as one consultant put it, vis-à-vis the unexpected cut in resources and
macroeconomic crisis. Frei learned that it would not be possible to
completely replace FUNDES' traditional mission-orientation with mar-
ket logic. In the sense of a reluctance to simplify (Weick et al., 1999),
the only way to manage the unexpected was to move towards a more
complex businessmodel: amission-driven andmarket-oriented organi-
zation. Frei and the head ofﬁce management team knew that it would
be crucial to carefully align the organization with this new strategy.4 ANDE is a global network of academic institutions, corporations, development ﬁnance
institutions and investment funds that aim to promote entrepreneurship in emerging
markets (ANDE, 2011) with roughly 80 members in 2010, including FUNDES.Changing its structure and formal processes was only one aspect —
FUNDES's network structurewould be transformed into amore central-
ized, hierarchical system, led by the head ofﬁce in Costa Rica. FUNDES
also set out to deﬁne and standardize key processes across countries.
All of these steps aimed to develop a uniﬁed image towards themarket.
An even more important aspect was to disseminate the new busi-
ness model within the organization. Communication played a crucial
role in this process. A number of workshops took place in 2009 and
2010, bringing together the managers and board members of ten
FUNDES country ofﬁces, allowing them to raise concerns, ask questions
and discuss the new strategy and business model. Frei and his manage-
ment teamworked to develop the countrymanagers' capacity to under-
stand and employ the new business model on a daily basis.
High Reliability Organizations emphasize communication, so that
everyone in the organization understands the “big picture” (Roberts &
Bea, 2001), that is the goal of the organization, what it does, and how
operations in one placemight impact the functioning of an organization
as a whole. Similarly, but more strategically focused, the FUNDES man-
agement team designed the workshops in a way that would allow the
managers and boardmembers of the country ofﬁces to develop a shared
big picture of what the new business model was, why it was important,
and how everyone could contribute to its implementation on a daily
basis. Frei explained the new, more complex mission–market orienta-
tion of the organization as such:
We are mission-driven, but need to become increasingly proﬁt ori-
ented. We strive for ﬁnancial results, as well as for positive social
and ecological impact.Contribution of FNDES International to countries 
Contribution of AVINA 
Fig. 3. Origin and allocation of funds (1000 USD). Source: Financial Report FUNDES
International.
Table 2
Important competitors and costumers of FUNDES in four important countries.
Country Competitor Government Large enterprises Boards Development organizations
Panama • IDCE (training and
consulting institute)
• INDEH (training)
•MITRADEL (Ministry of Labor)
•SENACYT (National Secretary of
Science, Techn. & Innovation)
• Alimentos Pascual (food)
• Gulf Oil (lubricant and fuel
products and services)
• APEX (export association)
• SIP (industrial union)
• SumaRSE (nonproﬁt,
promotion of CSR)
• COSPAE (NGO for private
sector training)
Costa Rica • CLACDS-INCAE (research
center)
• CEGESTI (nonproﬁt)
• CINPE (research and
training center)
• Grupo KAIZEN (training
and consulting)
•MEIC (Ministry oft he Economy,
Industry & Commerce)
• SBD (development bank)
• INA (national training institute)
• DOS PINOS (dairy
products)
• FLORIDA BEBIDAS (food
and beverage)
•METALCO (steel)
• CICR (chamber of industry)
• Consejo Mipyme (council for
micro and small enterprises)
• Instituto Excelencia
(chamber of industry)
• CEDEMIPYME (center for the
development of MSMEs)
El Salvador • FEPADE (foundation for
enterprise development)
• ESEN (higher school for
economics and business)
• CENPROMYPE (foundation for
the promotion of MSEs)
• INSAFOR (vocational training
institute)
• Alimentos DIANA (food) • ANEP (national business
association)
• Chamber of Industry and
Commerce
• CENTROMYPE
(foundation)
• GTZ (German Technical
Cooperation Agency)
Guatemala • CRECER (civil association)
• Rain Forest Alliance
(international nonproﬁt)
•Ministry of Economy • Cervecería
Centroamericana
(beverage)
• Grupo Solid (painting)
• Ingenio Pantaleón
(processing of sugar cane)
• AGEXPORT (association of
exporters)
• Chamber of industry
• Chamber of commerce
• EXPORTA (export consulting)
Source: based on CLACDS (2010), p. 10 (own translation).
Table 3
FUNDES income in 2012 (million USD).
Large ﬁrms Government Donors SMEs Total
Argentina 600 – – 21 621
Bolivia 22 – 437 89 548
Chile 626 602 48 97 1373
Colombia 1374 – – – 1374
Costa Rica 724 – – – 724
El Salvador 200 779 1494 19 2492
Guatemala 533 – – – 533
Mexico 102 1841 1399 – 3342
Panama 175 596 – – 771
Venezuela 149 – – – 149
Total 4505 3818 3378 226 11,927
Source: Financial Report FUNDES International.
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ments. At the same time, and with attention on the internal workings
of the organization (Weick & Putnam, 2006), he pointed out that this
new orientation would build on a capability that FUNDES had already
begun to develop in the form of supply chain development projects
with large companies, such as COPROCA in Bolivia.
The next step was for managers to understand how, on a daily basis,
they could implement the new type of projects that weremeant to con-
tribute to the fulﬁllment of FUNDES' social mission, while also securing
the organization's resilience and long-term ﬁnancial sustainability. But
how could the country managers explain to large companies in a uni-
formwaywhat the added valued of FUNDES's services would be within
the new business model? At this point, Frei introduced the concept of
“creating shared value,” having read about the idea in an article in Har-
vard Business Review (Porter & Kramer, 2011). Creating shared value
denotes an approach that allows businesses to increase their return on
investment by investing in social or environmental issues that affect
their companies in the medium and long-term. By supporting MSMEs,
these businesses followed strategies similar to that of FUNDES, albeit
with different goals:
Large ﬁrms are the ones who have the money and the need for
support in building up effective local supply chains. They are not
necessarily interested in poverty alleviation as such. But they know
that they have to take social issues and the natural environment into
account to guarantee their own long-term growth.
From Frei's point of view, these types of projects reﬂected an emerg-
ing trend among large enterprises like Nespresso. Large enterprises in-
creasingly establish projects in order to create shared value — and
FUNDES's new businessmodel would be to support large organizations,
together with the MSMEs along their value chains, to put this idea into
practice. For Frei, “creating shared value” reﬂected the two aspects of
the new businessmodel and conveyed the idea of creatingwin–win sit-
uations, rather than focusing on a market orientation and economic
logic alone to the detriment of a social mission orientation. The term
could also be used to explain to future FUNDES customers the
organization's added value and unique positioning.
Not all FUNDES managers could be convinced to support the new
business model and market-focus. They had joined FUNDES because of
their strong commitment to its social mission, and their capabilities
and experiences were in dealing with funding agencies, governmentsand MSMEs. Large enterprises were an entirely different machine.
Other managers were generally supportive of the new direction, but
remained doubtful that it would be possible to identify a sufﬁcient
number of large enterprises to go into this direction in their particular
countries (see Table 3). Thus, some mangers decided to leave FUNDES.
By 2013, the organization's budgetwas almost completely generated
through projects with large ﬁrms and governments (see Table 4).
FUNDES also became an ally of the “Shared Value Initiative,” launched
in 2012, which aims to strengthen the implementation of shared value
strategies worldwide.
6. Conclusion
This case study has traced the history and strategic development of
the nonproﬁt organization FUNDES from 1984 to 2011. As a pioneer in
the ﬁeld of economic developmentwork in Latin America, the organiza-
tion set out to serve a region with vast and largely underexplored social
needs, within a highly diverse and volatile environment. FUNDES re-
peatedly adapted its service portfolio, and ﬁnally changed its business
model in order to effectively fulﬁll and ﬁnance its mission to promote
the competitive development of MSMEs in Latin America. Departing
from the conceptual lens of collective mindfulness (Weick et al.,
1999), the case was designed to illustrate strategic practices that
FUNDES employed in order to remain effective in the face of ambiguity
and unexpected events.
The following conclusion ﬁrst summarizes two important principles
of mindfulness illustrated by FUNDES. It then reﬂects on themeaning of
Table 4
Sources of FUNDES income (million USD).
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
(budgeted)
Projects (with large ﬁrms and/or
governments)
2753 5096 7401 11,025 15,054
In percent of total income 42% 69% 87% 92% 99%
Consulting of SMEs 2630 483 269 123 86
In percent of total income 40% 7% 3% 1% 1%
Training of SMEs 1160 1820 879 779 –
In percent of total income 18% 25% 10% 7%
Total 6543 7399 8549 11,927 15,140
Source: Financial Report FUNDES International.
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it points out possible contributions of the case to the understanding of
effective strategic practices for operating in Latin America.
6.1. Principles of mindfulness at FUNDES
Out of the ﬁve principles thatWeick and Sutcliffe (2007) describe as
the basis of mindful organizations, two are particularly prevalent in the
case of FUNDES, and are essential to understanding how the organiza-
tion was able to continue to fulﬁll and ﬁnance its social mission over
time:
6.1.1. Preoccupation with failure
Mindful organizations pay attention to potential sources of errors
and see small deviations as occasions to adapt or improve what they
do and how they do it. At FUNDES, employees and managers exercised
vigilance when delivering their services and conducting projects. This
made them aware of early signs of change in the needs of MSMEs, and
allowed them to question how effectively FUNDES's services were
supporting the development of small enterprises in the region. Follow-
ing this initial awareness, FUNDES management launched more
thorough investigations to learn to what extend its services were still
meeting MSMEs' needs. The results spurred two key changes in the
organization's service portfolio: ﬁrst, the inclusion of training and busi-
ness environment development programs, in addition to credit guaran-
tees, in 1996; and second, the inclusion of consulting as an additional
service in 2004. From the perspective of mindfulness, these changes
brought the organization back in line with the needs of its beneﬁciaries
before it would begin to deviate from its mission in a signiﬁcant way.
6.1.2. Reluctance to simplify
Mindful organizations demonstrate healthy skepticism regarding
their own accomplishments and regarding simpliﬁed assumptions, in
order to not risk ignoring information that could be important for
decision-making. Put differently, they seek to “match external complex-
ity with internal complexity” (Weick et al., 2000: 35).
At FUNDES, the reluctance to simplify developed over time. Starting
in 2001, FUNDESmanagement needed to open up new funding sources
to compensate for the constant reduction of funds by its principal
donor Fundación AVINA. Instead of keeping its focus on donors,
management increased the types of funding sources to include support
from governments and other NPOs and INGOs and, ﬁnally, also earned
revenue by selling services to large businesses. Put differently, in the
face of increasing economic pressure, the organization increasingly
reﬂected the variety of external funding sources in its internal funding
structure.
The reluctance to simplify became particularly relevant when
FUNDES was confronted with the pending exit of its principal donor
and the effects of the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008. This rather unexpected
event led Ulrich Frei, the then CEO, to shift FUNDES from an organiza-
tionwith a predominantly social logic to amore complex,mindful orga-
nization that followed both a social and a business logic, attackingsimpliﬁcation and creating complexity on yet another level. By bringing
in an outsider with a strong business background, the FUNDES board
strived to prevent what can easily happen to organizations that lose
their sense of mindfulness: groups that “work to solve problems –
whether to contain an emerging crisis or to formulate long-term
strategy – […] run the danger of drawing on only those perceptions
that are held in common,while ignoring, discarding, or discounting per-
ceptions that are unique” (Weick et al., 2000: 35).
As the case shows, it is one thing to bring in an alternative view, and
yet another to actually implement a new, unique perspective. Based on
studies that conveyed a systematic overview of FUNDES' internal and
external context, Frei and his management team set out to align the
ten country ofﬁces with the new business model. They initiated a
number of activities that addressed the structure, processes, culture
and capacity of the organization and supported the development of
the new “big picture” (Roberts & Bea, 2001) and a new shared language
around “creating shared value.”
In sum, the increasing complexity of its context led FUNDES to
complement its original mission orientation with a business orienta-
tion; the organization needed to learn to become reluctant to simplify
and to fall too heavily on neither the social nor on the economic side.
Thismore fundamental change requiredplacing attention both outward
and inward (Weick & Putnam, 2006): on the changing conditions of
FUNDES' funding markets and the organization's extant capacity and
management skills.
6.2. Practices of strategic mindfulness of a nonproﬁt
Preoccupied with failure and reluctant to simplify, FUNDES
displayed two important principles through which classic HROs enact
collective mindfulness. Different from HROs, though, these principles
were geared towards the strategic, rather than the operational, level.
In the context of FUNDES as a nonproﬁt organization, “strategic”
meant taking action that is oriented towards fulﬁlling the organization's
social mission.
When HROs are preoccupied with failure, they monitor the errors
that impact daily communication, action or leadership practices and po-
tentially harm an HRO's ability to produce reliable outcomes (Weick &
Sutcliffe, 2007). Neither these errors, nor their elimination, affect an
HRO's strategic intent. FUNDES, however, monitored how effectively
its services promoted MSMEs and, therefore, the fulﬁllment of its mis-
sion. Proactively verifying if, and towhat extent, a nonproﬁt is effective-
ly fulﬁlling its social mission (Becker, 2003) can, therefore, be
interpreted as a preoccupation with failure on the strategic level of a
nonproﬁt.
Similarly, practices that expressed a reluctance to simplifywere related
to FUNDES' strategic intent. While an HRO tries to avoid simpliﬁcations
such as undifferentiated categorizations or one-sided explanations on
anoperational level, FUNDES aimed to avoid simpliﬁcations in its strategic
rationale (Anheier, 2005). Striving to ﬁndways to sustainably ﬁnance the
provision of its services, FUNDES integratedmultiple organizational logics
into a new business model, a capacity that it had developed over time
and was then able to fully exploit when confronted with the unexpected
ﬁnancial crisis.
The above suggests that actingmindfully on the strategic level, for a
nonproﬁt, means learning to be responsive in terms of strategic intent
(the provision and funding of services) in order to remain stable in
terms of the organization's social mission. The case illustrates that this
learning can ﬁrst, be triggered internally (by continuous attention to
the organization's core activities) or externally (in reaction to unexpect-
ed events); that, second, impact the provision of services as well as the
generation of resources; and third, can accompany a more (business
model) or less (service portfolio) fundamental strategic change. Further
studies are needed to illustrate strategic mindfulness among nonproﬁts
for principles other than a preoccupation with failure and reluctance to
simplify.
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Nonproﬁts are obviously a special case of Latin American organiza-
tions (Austin et al., 2006; Dolnicar et al., 2008). Nevertheless, from the
previous analysis, and with the due prudence necessary when making
generalizations from a teaching case, we suggest two contributions to
the understanding of effective strategic practices of ﬁrms operating in
Latin America:
First, orienting an organization's operations towards a single logic
does not seem to be sustainable in the long run. Organizations in Latin
America must be ﬁnancially sustainable in order to survive, but they
also face huge social and environmental challenges. Similar to theﬁnan-
cial crisis confronted by FUNDES, which put into question the
organization's sustainability if only operating according to a social mis-
sion, social and environmental issues can affect the effectiveness of prof-
it companies that only operate according to an economic logic. As recent
studies show, in onewayor another business organizations are required
to avoid simpliﬁcations, due to their traditional economic logic, and to
react to their social-environmental context in order to survive in
competitive markets in the long-run (Jäger & Sathe, 2014).
Second, in accordancewith the complex and volatile environment in
emerging countries (Ogliastri et al., 1999; Vassolo et al., 2011) and the
case of FUNDES, ﬁrms must protect the fulﬁllment of their economic
sustainability from environmental impact by monitoring failure
and possibly adapting or changing their strategies and businessmodels.
The prevalence of short-term decisions observedwithin Latin American
ﬁrms (Brenes, 2000; Brenes et al., 2007) now appears in a new light; as
long as these decisions are reactions to the results of monitoring
strategic failure (mindfulness), short-term decisions with no deliberate
long-term orientation can be a strength, not a weakness.
Against this background, not having a strategic plan and formal
strategy process can actually be a competitive advantage when operat-
ing in Latin America (Brenes, 2000; Brenes et al., 2007). Rather than de-
veloping and then implementing strategic plans that assume that the
world develops in a predictable way (Weick, 1979), ﬁrms are required
to continually observe and adapt to their environment in the short-
term in order to remain consistent in the long-term. In conclusion, the
concept of mindfulness opens a new perspective on how Latin
American ﬁrms can achieve sustainable competitive advantage.
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